With Hugo Chávez’s passing, some further remarks on issues facing Venezuela in the immediate future.
First, there will almost inevitably be some political bloviating that his death marks the “end of the left” in Latin America (primarily because such articles have appeared periodically for nearly a year). Suffice to say, such narratives will be as lazy as they are wrong. Though many of Chávez’s opponents in the US media have liked to portray him as the head of some uniform bloc of Latin American leaders, nothing could be further from the truth. Even while he had close allies in people like Ecuador’s Rafael Correa or Bolivia’s Evo Morales, both of those men were their own politicians with their own domestic backgrounds in their own countries, elected by their own electorates based on their own policies. The idea that they were pawns in some bizarre hemispheric chess match is absurd. While they may have sympathized with Chávez regularly, they have had their own agendas and their own methods of ruling, methods that have regularly demonstrated significant distinctions from Chávez. Though Chávez was a vocal individual, he was far from a ringleader or a commandant for others; as President Dilma Rousseff of Brazil (another of these allegedly-”left” countries, and no slouch in regional politics by any stretch of the imagination) put it, Brazil “did not always agree with Chávez.” Narratives that treat him as the leader of a monolithic left in Latin America will show nothing but the authors’ own ignorance of the region.
Second, the process for selecting the next president will be worth watching. According to the Venezuelan constitution, a new election must be held in the next thirty days. Vice President Nicolás Maduro, acting on Chávez’s behalf for the past few months, has certainly had a chance to learn the ropes, but the constant focus on Chávez’s health even in his own governmental declarations has not really shed light on how he might govern should he win the office, nor how capable he is of governing; and even if he wins the election, it is not clear if he will be able to maintain the support from a variety of groups that Chávez sustained.
And then there’s the opposition, which inevitably will hope to take advantage of this new opening, but which has been unable to really create a concrete platform that might appeal to the majority of Venezuelan voters. Indeed, whether the opposition can remain unified witout Chávez, who was the key component in bringing a heterogeneous group of voters together, remains to be seen. Certainly, it seems Maduro has a leg up on the opposition in this context, what with his ties to Chávez, his (brief) tenure as de facto president, the emotional appeal many Chávez supporters will feel in continuity with Maduro, and the brief amount of time the opposition has to try to organize a successful campaign. Either way, though, whoever follows Chávez in the longer-term is in many ways going to have to contend with Chávez’s ghost, a task that could prove particularly burdensome if the economy and social programs that oil has supported for so many years begin to deteriorate.
What role the military will play going forward is another matter looming over Venezuela’s immediate future. While Chávez was able to sow strong ties with and support from the military (due to his own military background), Maduro does not have such ties, nor is it clear whether any opposition figures who may seek office can find support among the military. Given how instrumental the military was in Chávez’s rise, especially in the early years, there is a real question of how the military will respond to this new context: whether it will sit on the sidelines or actively work to support a particular candidate remains to be seen, but it seems unlikely that it will be a silent actor in the process of succession or in the implementation of policies going forward.
Additionally, and perhaps somewhat tied to the outcome of the previous three points, we’ll finally get a sense of if Chávez’s reforms can and/or will be institutionalized, and how different groups (Maduro, the next president, the military, the public) might assert themselves in the process. In many ways, this is the crux of defining Chavismo; whether it was a movement that transformed society, or a movement that was defined in a man, will become apparent in Chávez’s absence.
As for portrayals of Chávez himself, they have tended to focus on the monolithic and the simplistic, thanks in no small part to his own efforts to appeal to a personalist populism-of-sorts, to say nothing of the way media focus on his health in the last year-plus added to the individualistic narrative that equated Chávez-as-Venezuela. That said, there’s no question he was a complicated figure, having effected some real improvements for many Venezuelans even while making some bad moves that could display a singular use of power against his opponents.
Simply put, Chávez was neither as terrible as his most strident detractors maintained, nor as perfect as his most ardent supporters insisted. Beyond that, only time will tell the long-term impacts Chávez’s fourteen years of governance, social reform, and international relations will have on Venezuela.
Hugo Chávez has died. Rumors had swirled around about his impending end for years, but it appears his cancer and its side-effects finally caught up with him. Suffice to say, uncertainties for Venezuela abound going forward. Nicolás Maduro will continue to serve as de facto president while the country prepares for elections. Whether Chávez’s reforms can be institutionalized in his absence, and who could potentially be responsible for institutionalizing them in a post-Chávez context, remains to be seen. Likewise, how the opposition responds to a new political context where they do not face the figure of Chávez had a military background that Maduro does not, and that could matter in the latter’s efforts to remain in the presidency. The opposition has operated primarily on an anti-Chávez platform for years; will they finally be able to provide an actual platform of policies in Chávez’s absence? And how might a Venezuelan population that by and large saw an improved standard of living under Chávez receive such platforms? How will the economy, which has seen both growth and inflation in recent weeks and months, respond? And then there is the role of the military going forward. Chávez had a military background that Maduro does not, and that could matter in the latter’s efforts to remain in the presidency. How will the military respond to his death? Is Maduro’s recent denial that there was a rift between him and the military just a minor issue, or the source of deeper political tensions?
These are just a handful of the immediate questions in a country facing real challenges and sudden, if somewhat expected, uncertainties at the highest level of governance. Indeed, in many ways, the fact that there are so many uncertainties facing Venezuela in the wake of Chávez’s death seems like an appropriate end of an era that was full of both uncertainties and accomplishments. I’ll have more thoughts on what all this might mean for Venezuela tomorrow, but for now – rest in peace.
Venezuela expels the US Air Force attaché after suggesting that Chávez’s cancer was the result of “enemies” inflicting him (even while questions of governance and reforms beyond Chávez remain on the sidelines). Ch. This isn’t the first time that Chávez or his allies have made such a claim. Regardless of the veracity or falseness of the claim, it’s yet another weird thread in an already-strange story.
Late last night, the Venezuelan government announced that Hugo Chávez’s health had deteriorated to some uncertain degree, only further adding to the confusion of Venezuelans. Some were seen praying for Chávez even while a government official criticized anti-Chavez opponents for seeking “violence.” All of this only adds to an atmosphere that was already fertile for all kinds of allegations, (including the report that Chávez has secretly returned to Cuba for more treatments). As Greg Weeks commented, “expect plenty of Hugo Chávez rumors today.” And all of this after students and other anti-Chávez groups took to the streets to protest and demand information about his health.
Lost in all of this, of course, is the actual state of governance in Venezuela, now and going forward. One thing that strikes me is that all of this rumor-mongering and half-reports on Chávez’s health could only be a further obstacle to institutionalizing his reforms. By focusing strictly on his deteriorating health and the possibility of when he might die, the narrative on Venezuelan politics in both Venezuela and in the media reinforces a focus on Chávez that denies the more complicated realities and possibilities of Veneuzelan politics in the present and the future. Whereas such discussions could focus on the post-Chávez transition and could examine possible ways in which his reforms could be further institutionalized, instead many end up just discussing whether Chávez is or isn’t dead (thanks in no part to official reports that are often lacking in details, creating rife circumstances for speculation); this only reifies the equation of “Chávez-as-Venezuela’s government” narrative. This isn’t to say the changes begun under Chávez over the last fourteen-plus years will automatically disappear with him. But if he, rather than his social policies, continues to be the sole focus among both his opponents and his supporters, they only reinforce the cult of personality of Chávez, and raise questions about the possibility of continuing, reforming, or undoing his social programs once he’s gone.
Out of nowhere this morning, Hugo Chávez returned to Venezuela, six months after winning reelection and two months after going to Cuba to receive unspecified treatments. That he can travel certainly suggests he may be improving somewhat at least, though photos released last week (with him resting in each) likewise suggest he is far from completely healthy. While his return likely means he perhaps can finally be sworn in, the secrecy of the last two months, and the suddenness of his return, doesn’t really do anything to clarify what will happen going forward, especially as it relates to the institutionalization of his reforms. Will he directly govern and attempt to reassert control over the reform process? Will he serve as a symbol for the programs while Madero performs the dirty work of daily governance? Will the opposition solidify or crumble in the face of his return? As is often the case with Chávez, the questions come more easily than the answers do, though no doubt the coming months will provide some answers.
-Early reports are saying
245 232 people died in a nightclub fire last night in Santa Maria, a city in Brazil’s southernmost state of Rio Grande do Sul. Somewhere between 300 and 400 people were reportedly at the event, a party for university students. Apparently, the fire’s source was a live band’s pyrotechnics. [UPDATE: The Guardian has photos from the scene last night, some of which are fairly graphic.]
-In Venezuela, prison violence between prisoners and the Venezuelan National Guard at a prison in Barquisimeto left sixty-one dead and around 120 wounded.
-El Salvador will be holding presidential elections next year, and Salvador Sánchez Cerén, the candidate for the incumbent-party FSLN, has said he will seek a repeal of the 1993 amnesty law that has protected war criminals and human rights violators, mostly in the military and governments between 1980 and 1992, from prosecution for their crimes.
-Cícero Guedes, an important figure in Brazil’s Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (Landless Workers’ Movement; MST), was shot dead as he returned home from an area near a sugar plantation MST members had recently occupied.
-Guatemala’s recent efforts to militarize public institutions, including those not directly connected to security forces, have created concerns over the potential stability of democratic institutions.
-In Bolivia, activists and feminists are demanding prosecution of provincial representative Domingo Alcibia, who was caught on security video apparently raping a drunk woman while she was unconscious.
-Brazil is set to launch a massive four-year study of the Amazonian rainforest that will detail the tree-count, biodiversity, and animal life in the region. The study is the first of its kind conducted since the late-1970s, when the military dictatorship conducted a similar study.
-In both Peru and Argentina, recent struggles over mining continue to shape social and political struggles, as people in Peru continue to protest the environmental consequences of mining, while in Argentina, powerful mining companies are using their economic influence and political ties to try to silence local journalists who seek to report on the environmental consequences of the mining activity in the northwestern parts of the country.
-While forty companies, including the massive Grupo Clarín (which has recently butted heads with President Cristina Kirchner) tend to dominate the market, a recent study found that alternative press in Argentina is also thriving.
-In a boon to historians of the Southern Cone (or Great Britain), last week Uruguay declassified archives on the Malvinas War, providing access to new diplomatic and previously-unknown materials on the war and its regional impact.
-Finally, in a unique mixture of 21st technology and urban history, Rio de Janeiro has begun incorporating QR codes into the city’s sidewalks to aid tourists, melding the codes into the city’s traditional mosaic sidewalks.
While drones a topic of discussion and debate among military analysts, civil libertarians, and scholars in the US, the unmanned aircraft are certainly not strictly the domain of the US alone. Many Latin American countries are developing their own “drone” technology for a variety of purposes, from monitoring favelas in Brazil to monitor drug cartels in the Dominican Republic, from protecting pipelines in Colombia to patrolling borders in Chile. Anna Kroos at Just the Facts has an excellent rundown on drones, their uses, and their development in Brazil, Chile, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela, a rundown that is required reading for anybody interested in Latin American military technology, politics, and society.
I was going to write on Mark Weisbrot’s recent piece on what has been accomplished during Hugo Chávez’s governance, but Erik beat me to the punch:
I don’t think there’s any doubt that Chavez not exactly an ideal guy for the left to be following. I’ve always thought his version of socialism was too much bombast and not enough good governance. Sticking your thumb in the United States’ eye may have value, but not as much as ensuring good trash pickup for poor people. Anyway, Mark Weisbrot has a pretty good overview, arguing that Chavez may have been able to be Chavez because of oil money (and outright US hostility that only strengthened his hand at home), but at least it went to improving the lives of the Venezuelan people and not into offshore bank accounts.
Like Chavez or not, but don’t deny that life for the average Venezuelan is almost certainly better than when he took power. And even if you think that’s entirely because of high oil prices, remember that corrupt leaders in the past siphoned the money into their own pockets and that Chavez’s enemies want an austerity program in the country that would fall entirely on the backs of the poor. Or for a current example of this, see Nigeria.
I agree with this. I have had my own questions about how much Chávez is “left,” but by any reasonable metric (i.e., neither those from sycophantic and uncritical Chávez supporters or rabid anti-Chávez opponents), it seems he has been able to truly change the face of society and work towards some degree of social equality in Venezuela. Whether or not those reforms can be institutionalized in a way that allows issues of equality and social justice to continue to improve in a post-Chávez scenario (which will happen sooner or later) remains to be seen.
Unable to attend his own inauguration tomorrow due to complications from cancer/surgery, Hugo Chávez’s inauguration to a fourth presidential term has been postponed. Unsurprisingly, while his supporters claim the inauguration ceremony is merely a formality, opponents are calling on the Supreme Tribunal of Justice to make a ruling on the matter. Of course, how the court will rule later today is unclear; while many of the judges are Chávez-era appointees (under the 1999 constitution that created the Supreme Tribunal of Justice, judges are limited to one 12-year term), there’s nothing to indicate how they will rule on this particular matter.
Perhaps more importantly, the postponement of the inauguration raises some real questions about Chávez’s Bolivarian Revolution. When he won re-election back in October, I commented that it was unclear whether he would try to institutionalize the social changes he’s made in a way that would allow them to continue once he no longer ran the country, or whether he would continue to personally be both the face and the authority of the Bolivarian Revolution. The latest news suggests that, even if he were to institutionalize it, he did not have adequate time (or waited too long, depending on one’s perspective); certainly, his hand-picked successor, Nicolás Maduro, has been governing in his stead, but the fact that Chávez remains ill enough to not be able to attend the inauguration, creating constitutional uncertainty over whether or not he can “continue” without an inauguration, suggests his social program is still very much bound in Chávez the person. That’s not to say the Revolution will die with Chávez, but it may end up falling out of Chávez’s control sooner than he’d anticipated.